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1.1  Introduction 
With this conference, held nineteen years after the appearance of Krug- 
man’s pathbreaking  article on speculative attacks, the literature on this 
subject can be said to have passed through adolescence and reached matu- 
rity (in, one hopes, all senses of the word). Like any maturing subject, this 
one evinces changing preoccupations. The early literature on speculative 
attacks focused on conflicts between the stance of monetary  and fiscal 
policies on the one hand and the authorities’ exchange rate commitment 
on the other. An attack was assumed to occur when excessively expansion- 
ary monetary  and  fiscal policies gradually depleted the central  bank’s 
international reserves. It was triggered when those reserves fell to a criti- 
cal threshold at which they were abruptly exhausted by currency specula- 
tors. This model was attuned to the time in the sense that inflation and, 
by  implication, excessively expansionary  monetary  and  fiscal  policies 
were  widespread problems,  creating chronically overvalued currencies, 
and in that capital markets were less than fully liberalized, limiting the 
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ability  of  central banks and governments  to borrow  to defend  the ex- 
change rate.’ 
More recently, attention  has shifted to conflicts between  the internal 
and external objectives of governments. Where the “first generation” mod- 
els referred to above highlighted conflicts between domestic and external 
policy instruments, “second generation” models focus instead on internal 
and external objectives. In recent models, optimizing central banks and 
governments are assumed to maximize a welfare function that has as argu- 
ments domestic variables like output, employment, and the stability of the 
banking system on the one hand and external variables like the commit- 
ment  to the exchange  rate peg on the other. Central  banks are free to 
borrow, and the level of reserves no longer determines their capacity to 
defend the exchange rate. But there may be a conflict between the steps 
required to defend the currency and those that work to stabilize output, 
employment, and the banking system. Hence, worsening domestic condi- 
tions may tip the balance toward policies to stabilize output and employ- 
ment and induce the authorities to abandon the currency peg. To the ex- 
tent that the markets are aware of these incentives, a gradual deterioration 
in domestic conditions may lead investors to anticipate the inevitable and 
precipitate an attack. And that attack can occur without evidence of the 
inflation, current account deficits, monetary excesses, and overvaluation 
on which first-generation models depend.’ 
Like their predecessors,  these second-generation models, developed in 
the early 199Os, were stimulated by the events of the time. The speculative 
attacks of the early nineties took place in an environment of high capital 
mobility in which the ability of central banks to borrow was no longer an 
issue. In a number of cases, of which France in 1992-93  is the most fre- 
quently cited example, attacks occurred in the absence of obvious evidence 
of monetary excesses, inflation, competitiveness problems, and current ac- 
count deficits. They  took place  in  the context  of  high  unemployment, 
which rendered governments reluctant  to raise interest rates and restrict 
credit in order to defend the currency if doing so meant aggravating labor 
market conditions. Some countries had weak banking systems whose sta- 
bility might have been further  jeopardized by policies restricting the avail- 
ability of credit. Others had governments that had issued large amounts 
I. Borrowing to defend the exchange rate was not impossible, only difficult.  But to the 
extent that borrowed reserves had to be paid back with interest, borrowing aggravated any 
existing fiscal imbalance and might not even delay the crisis. See Buiter (1987). 
2. The original Krugman formulation assumed purchasing power parity, so no change in 
the ratio of domestic to foreign price levels was possible; excess demand at home produced 
current account deficits but no overvaluation. Subsequent models relaxed  the purchasing- 
power-parity assumption and allowed monetization to produce inflation and overvaluation 
in the period leading up to the attack (e.g., Calvo 1987; Willman 1988). But from the stand- 
point of the distinctions of concern to us here, these differences in assumption are of little 
consequence. Currency Crisis and Unemployment: Sterling in 193  1  9 
of short-dated public debt, on which debt-servicing costs were highly sen- 
sitive to the level of interest  rates. All these were reasons why  officials 
might have perceived a conflict between the measures needed to defend 
the currency and those appropriate for pursuing domestic economic objec- 
tives, and why  a deterioration in  domestic conditions might precipitate 
an atta~k.~ 
However appealing the explanation these models provide for such epi- 
sodes as the attacks on the French franc in  1992-93,  their generality has 
been questioned by authors who continue to emphasize excessive inflation 
and problems of external competitiveness as causes of currency crises (see, 
e.g., Krugman  1996; Dornbusch,  Goldfajn, and Valdes  1995). Second- 
generation models, they note, have been subjected to few empirical tests 
(see, however, Jeanne  1997a; Jeanne and Masson 2000). In a sense, the 
generality and empirical applicability of the insights about real-world be- 
havior that can be gleaned from these models remain contentious issues. 
In this paper we explore the insights about the 1931 sterling crisis to be 
gained from applying a second-generation model and in turn attempt to 
push this strand of literature forward a few modest steps. Our focus on 
the 1930s is no happenstance, for the Great Depression  is  the obvious 
hunting ground for investigators seeking to understand the connections 
between unemployment and currency instability. Not only was this a de- 
cade of unprecedented  unemployment throughout  the industrial world, 
but the period was marked by rampant speculative attacks that culminated 
in the collapse of the gold-exchange-standard system. Much has been writ- 
ten about the unemployment and the currency crises of the 1930s, but in 
most of this literature the two phenomena are only obliquely linked. And 
the sterling crisis is the obvious place to start. Unemployment had been 
the highest for the longest in the United Kingdom, and the attack  on 
3. The distinction we have drawn here, between first-generation models, in which attacks 
occur because domestic demand is excessive (and spills over into imports and reserve losses) 
and second-generation models, in which attacks occur because domestic demand is deficient 
(causing unemployment and undermining the authorities’ resolve to defend the currency), 
is different from that drawn by  other authors (viz. Krugman 1996; International Monetary 
Fund 1997; Flood and Marion 1999). These authors emphasized instead the distinction be- 
tween models that are characterized by unique or by multiple equilibria. From our point of 
view, this is a secondary issue: both classes of models we have described may feature either 
unique or multiple equilibria, depending on details of specification. First-generation models 
produce a unique equilibrium if the authorities’ policy process is unique and invariant (in 
Krugman’s case, if they adopt an unchanging fiscal policy and monetize all deficits). They 
produce multiple equilibria if  the policy process is contingent and the authorities are as- 
sumed to shift to a more inflationary monetary policy if and only if the currency is attacked 
(as in Flood and Garber 1984 and Obstfeld 1986). But both possibilities are also present in 
second-generation models. If a rise in (exogenously determined) unemployment increases 
devaluation expectations without feedback, the timing of speculative attacks will be uniquely 
determined. But if unemployment in turn depends on the level of interest rates, which re- 
spond to devaluation expectations, then expectations of devaluation can prove self-fulfilling 
and multiple equilibria can arise. 10  Barry Eichengreen and Olivier Jeanne 
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sterling in  1931 was the pivotal event in the collapse of the interwar gold 
standard. We  believe-and  seek to convince the reader-that  a second- 
generation model of currency crises and unemployment sheds consider- 
able light on this episode. 
We do so in a paper organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents an over- 
view of the unemployment and monetary situations. Besides reviewing the 
evidence, we introduce some prior accounts that are interpretable in terms 
of the relations driving second-generation models. Section 1.3 presents a 
theoretical model suitable for formalizing the facts and derives its proper- 
ties. Section 1.4 reports our attempt to marshal econometric support for 
that  specification. Section  1.5 analyzes the causes of the sterling crisis. 
Section 1.6, in concluding, seeks to draw out the broader implications. 
1.2  Background 
The period on which we  focus is demarcated by Britain’s return to the 
prewar parity on 25 April 1925 and its departure from gold on 19 Septem- 
ber  1931. Figure  1.1, displaying the monthly  rate  of unemployment  as 
calculated by the Ministry of Labour, reminds us that unemployment was 
a thorn in the lion’s paw throughout the period. Having risen to the double Currency Crisis and Unemployment: Sterling in 1931  11 
digits by  the time the return to gold took place, the unemployment rate 
jumped to a new peak in excess of  14 percent in  the wake of the coal 
strike of mid-1926, whose disruptive effects lingered for several quarters. 
It hovered in the range of 9 to 12 percent before soaring to levels in excess 
of 20 percent following the onset of the Great Depre~sion.~ 
Debate centered on whether the government’s exchange rate commit- 
ment had contributed to this joblessness. Starting in 1920 Britain under- 
went five years of retrenchment in order to reverse the effects of its war- 
time inflation and to reduce prices to lower levels like those that prevailed 
in the United States, thereby permitting the prewar exchange rate against 
the dollar to be restored. Sterling appreciated faster than wages, and prices 
declined. The markets  knew that the act of Parliament suspending the 
gold standard would expire in 1925 and that extending it would embarrass 
the government,  suggesting that  the  authorities  would  persist  in  their 
efforts to deflate and to restore sterling to its prewar level against the dollar 
prior to the end of that year.5  They bid up the currency in anticipation.6 
Monetary  stringency and high real interest  rates superimposed on a 
backdrop of large-scale demobilization had predictable effects. Unemploy- 
ment was already high, in other words, when the sterling parity was re- 
stored. But why  it rose as high as it did and then failed to decline are 
contested issues. On one side are those who emphasize a series of negative 
shocks (the coal strike in  1926, interest rate hikes by  a Federal Reserve 
Board concerned with “excessive speculation” on Wall Street starting in 
1928, and then the Great Depression) imposed on a labor market that had 
lost much  of  its nominal flexibility, combined  with  a  government pre- 
vented from engaging in much countercyclical stabilization by  the con- 
straints of  a fixed exchange rate. On the other side are observers who 
emphasize labor market rigidities caused by an overly generous unemploy- 
ment insurance scheme that raised the reservation wage, reduced the in- 
4.  The official unemployment series reported here was generated by  dividing the number 
of insured workers registered as unemployed by  the number covered by  the unemployment 
insurance system. This is problematic to the extent that coverage of the insurance system 
was  incomplete; in particular, agricultural workers, public employees, household workers, 
and recent labor force entrants (who had not yet made the requisite number of weekly contri- 
butions to qualify for insurance) were excluded. Feinstein (1972) adjusted the annual aver- 
ages using decennial census figures for unemployment as benchmarks,  obtaining slightly 
lower rates. But it was the official figures based on the insurance system that were fodder for 
the political debate and as such figured in the government’s objective function and hence in 
market assessments of likely future policies. 
5. A process modeled by  Miller and Sutherland (1994). 
6. The extent to which sterling was therefore overvalued when pegged to the dollar in April 
1925 is the subject of a classic debate. Keynes’s (1925) estimate was that sterling was overval- 
ued by  10 to 15 percent. Subsequent authors have challenged his calculations on a number 
of grounds; e.g.,  from a variety of available U.S. price indexes, Keynes just happened  to 
choose the one for the state of Massachusetts indicating the largest overvaluation for sterling. 
More representative indexes suggested a somewhat smaller overvaluation on the order of 5 
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tensity of search, and boosted the equilibrium unemployment  rate. The 
modern literature  acknowledges the compatibility  of the two views, al- 
though  there is no consensus on the relative weights that should be at- 
tached to them.' 
Some insight into the operation of these factors can be gleaned from 
figures 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4. Figure 1.2 shows the real exchange rate, measured 
as the ratio of U.K. and U.S. consumer prices. It provides no evidence of 
real appreciation and growing overvaluation in 1929-3 1  -to  the contrary.X 
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 suggest that the real wage and real interest rate were 
more important channels transmitting the negative demand shock to the 
labor market.'  Given that the nominal  interest  rate is bounded  at zero, 
deflation boosted the ex post real interest rate, producing Fisherian debt 
deflation  (fig.  1.4).1°  Given  the downward  resistance  of  money  wages, 
7. The state of the art is Hatton (1988) and Dimsdale, Nickell, and Horsewood (1989). 
8. Multilateral effective exchange rate indexes based on trade weights tell essentially the 
same story; see Redmond (1980). 
9. The real wage was computed as the nominal wage divided by the consumer price index 
(CPI). The real interest rate is a moving average of the three-month nominal interest rate 
net of CPI inflation over the preceding twelve months. 
10. The international evidence on the operation of these mechanisms is extensive; see, e.g., 
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deflation led to a large rise in the real cost of labor (fig.  1.3). With the 
authorities slow to adjust unemployment benefits in nominal terms, the 
fall in prices also led to a large increase in the real value of benefits. Thus 
the fixed exchange rate, operating through these channels, transmitted the 
negative external  disturbance into a  sharp rise  in unemployment  after 
1929. 
This unemployment then fed back to the foreign exchange market. Fig- 
ure 1.5 shows the interest differential as a crude measure of devaluation 
expectations, along with a more sophisticated measure: the expected re- 
alignment probability times the expected change in the exchange rate in 
the  event  of  a  realignment  constructed  using  Svensson's  (1993) drift- 
adjustment method." These estimates suggest that the realignment expec- 
tation rose from zero to about 1 percent at the beginning of 1931 (although 
this perceived probability was no larger than the devaluation expectations 
that prevailed immediately following Britain's return to gold, during the 
1926 coal strike, and during the 1927 episode when the Bank of France 
11. The change in the exchange rate was regressed on a constant and on the current rate 
to obtain an estimate of expected movements within the band. The fitted values were then 
subtracted from the interest rate, producing the estimates of the expected rate of devaluation. Currency Crisis and Unemployment: Sterling in 1931  15 
was converting sterling reserves into gold). In August 193  1, devaluation 
expectations shot upward,  coincident with the German financial crisis. 
This pattern suggests that any effect of unemployment on devaluation ex- 
pectations was nonlinear: while unemployment rose steadily from the end 
of 1929, devaluation expectations rose only modestly at best before shoot- 
ing upward in the two months immediately prior to Britain’s forced sus- 
pension of the sterling parity.I2 
The  linkage  between  unemployment  and  realignment  expectations 
hinted  at in  the historical literature can be understood  in  terms  of the 
mechanisms highlighted by  second-generation speculative attack models. 
A brief review of events serves to bring this out. Reports of “distrust of 
sterling” first began to circulate in November  1930, following the Nazis’ 
gains in the Reichstag election and the consequent shock to confidence 
(Clay 1957, 369). Gold began draining from London to Paris and New 
York, creating mounting concern in the Committee of Treasury, the Bank 
of England’s policy-making body. The collapse of the Credit-Anstalt in 
June and the contagious spread of the crisis to Germany were an even 
more serious shock. Austria’s and Germany’s imposition of exchange con- 
trols reminded observers that gold convertibility was not sacrosanct, and 
their import-restricting measures weakened Britain’s prospective current 
account balance.13  In addition, under the provisions of the German stand- 
still, some &70 million  of  German debts to  British  banks were  frozen 
(Cairncross and Eichengreen 1983, 62). 
As in modern models of contagion, the crisis soon spread to Britain. On 
Monday 13 July, the day the failure of one of Germany’s largest financial 
institutions, the Darmstadter Bank, was announced, the Bank of England 
first lost gold for export. Not only did that failure freeze additional British 
claims on central European banks, but it occurred on the same day the 
press printed the findings of the Macmillan committee, whose report in- 
cluded an alarming estimate of London’s short-term foreign indebtedness. 
Two days later sterling fell sharply against the dollar and the French franc, 
and gold losses accelerated. Over the two and a half weeks from 13 July, 
the Bank of England lost more than &50  million of reserves, the equivalent 
of a month and a half of exports. Sterling dropped  sharply on 15 July, 
12. A prior attempt to account for the time profile of devaluation expectations (Eichen- 
green and Hsieh  1996) did not  test for such a nonlinearity. These authors regressed the 
measures in fig. 1.5 on U.S. and U.K. unemployment, the British real exchange rate (a proxy 
for British competitiveness), the British balance of trade (as a monthly proxy for the current 
account), and German gold reserves (a measure of  any contagion effects of the German 
crisis). They found that an increase in British unemployment was positively associated with 
devaluation expectations over the entire sample period  (significantly so, with a t-statistic 
ranging from 2 to 4). 
13. Similarly, the increasingly real threat that the countries of central and eastern Europe 
might suspend interest payments on their external debts and that Germany might suspend 
reparation payments led to negative revisions of consensus forecasts of the British current 
account position. 16  Barry Eichengreen and Olivier Jeanne 
prompting George Harrison of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to 
cable Montagu Norman, the governor of the Bank of England, expressing 
his alarm. Next followed the release of the Report of the May Committee 
on National Expenditure, which showed how markedly the fiscal position 
had deteriorated in the face of the deepening slump. 
The immediate task for the government then became to strengthen the 
fiscal position. Not only would this reduce the pressure of demand, improv- 
ing the current account, but it would signal the authorities’ commitment 
to financial  orthodoxy,  strengthening confidence  and  not  incidentally 
making it easier to borrow abroad. (J. P.  Morgan and Co., among others, 
made clear that their willingness to lend to the British government would 
be conditioned on its adoption of budgetary measures.) This proved, how- 
ever, to be easier said than done. The Labour cabinet was  unwilling to 
significantly reduce unemployment benefits, as recommended by the May 
committee. The resulting deadlock led the prime minister, Ramsay Mac- 
Donald, to tender his government’s resignation to the king. The coalition 
national government that  was formed on 24 August did little better  in 
the month that followed. The chancellor, Philip Snowden, unveiled a new 
emergency budget on 10 September, but marches by the unemployed, ob- 
jections by judges and teachers over prospective pay cuts, and passive dis- 
obedience by sailors in the Atlantic fleet, played in the press as a mutiny, 
raised doubts that  it could  be implemented.  This rebellion on the left 
raised the prospect of a Labour victory in the impending general election, 
implying that any rapidly implemented fiscal steps might only be reversed 
(Cottrell 1995). 
Thus, with the immobilization  of fiscal policy,  responsibility  for de- 
fending the exchange rate fell to the central bank. What is striking about 
the Bank of England’s response was its reluctance to raise interest rates. 
An increase in the discount rate was considered on 16 July but rejected. 
The rate was raised by one point to 3.5 percent on 23 July and by another 
point a week later. But this was the final change prior to the suspension 
of gold convertibility. The textbook response would have been to “let gold 
go” (to allow gold losses to set the deflationary price-specie flow mecha- 
nism into motion) and to step up Bank rate to reinforce the deflationary 
pressure. And from July there were calls for the Bank of England to do  just 
that (Sayers 1976, 392-93).  Instead, it utilized spot and forward market 
intervention to support the exchange rate, keeping it well above the gold 
export point and relying on foreign credits to finance the requisite opera- 
tions in the hope that the weakness of the balance of payments would 
prove tran~itory.’~  All the while, reserves drained away. They were replen- 
14. The one time the Bank of England allowed sterling to fall below the gold export point, 
on 5 August, precipitated  a near panic,  after which  the  Bank resolved not to repeat the 
experience. An analysis of the Bank’s spot and forward intervention is Moggridge (1972). Currency Crisis and Unemployment: Sterling in 1931  17 
ished in late August by another round of foreign credits, but by 17 Septem- 
ber more than half of these had been consumed. The reserve losses of the 
18th were massive and unprecedented. The Bank of England saw the writ- 
ing on the wall: late on the 18th’ a Friday, Sir Ernest Harvey, the Bank’s 
deputy governor, informed the prime minister that the Bank retained lim- 
ited resources for intervention on Saturday, but in any case it would be 
unable to support the rate when the markets reopened on Monday. The 
Bank should therefore be authorized to suspend gold payments, with legis- 
lation to be passed on Monday. The decision was taken to abandon gold. 
This hesitancy to raise the discount rate and to otherwise allow credit 
conditions to tighten is remarkable in light of the fact that Bank rate in- 
creases had been the standard tool for dealing with reserve losses since 
the days of Walter Bagehot.I5  As Fraser put it, “That Great Britain should 
go off the gold standard with the bank rate at 4  1/2 per cent seems unbe- 
lievable. That the rate was not pushed up to 8 or 10 per cent in July 1931 
created an unfavourable impression abroad, and caused foreigners to be- 
lieve that, after all, the British authorities would not make a real fight for 
the gold standard” (1933, 113). 
The explanation,  historical  accounts  suggest, is  that  the  authorities 
feared that interest rate increases would worsen unemployment, already 
in the neighborhood of 20 percent, and aggravate the stagnant condition 
of the British economy. “At the onset of the Great Depression,” Janeway 
wrote, “Britain had already suffered nearly a decade of unemployment in 
excess of one million insured workers. This was the central economic fact 
that constrained monetary policy throughout the period” (1995-96,  255). 
Further deterioration in the employment situation threatened to under- 
mine support for the government and for its gold standard policies, sug- 
gesting that the discount rate increase might ultimately have to be  re- 
versed.  Realizing  that  the  tactic  was  unsustainable  and,  if  anything, 
increased the likelihood that the defense of the exchange rate would have 
to be abandoned, investors would  have responded negatively to further 
increases in Bank rate and stepped up their sales of domestic assets. 
What distinguished the Bank of England’s priorities in  1931 from its 
priorities in  previous periods  was  partly  that  unemployment had  now 
scaled unprecedented heights, tipping the balance away from further aus- 
terity  in  the  interest  of  currency  stabilization. In  addition, important 
changes in the political environment had occurred. Before World War I, 
in Sir Otto Neimeyer’s famous words, “a change in bank rate was no more 
regarded as the business of the Treasury than the colour which the Bank 
painted its front door.” During the war, however, the maintenance of the 
15. As Bank of England officials themselves described in National Monetary Commission 
(1910) and again in their evidence before the Macmillan committee in 1931 (Committee on 
Finance and Industry 1931). 18  Barry Eichengreen and OIivier Jeanne 
gold standard and pursuit  of  price  stability had  been  subordinated  to 
other, more pressing goals, ultimately, national survival. This “wartime 
politicization” of Bank rate carried over to the March 1919 veto by Lloyd 
George’s chancellor of a proposed increase (Janeway 1995-96,255). When 
the central bank again attempted to raise interest rates in October 1919 
to prevent the economy from overheating, it was strongly attacked by es- 
tablishment  spokesmen like the Economist  and the Statist.  Even more 
significant than the existence of  this opposition,  as Hume notes, were 
the arguments on which it was based, namely, whether “a rise in bank rate 
[will] check speculation  more than it checks production”  (Economist, 8 
November 1919, p. 850; quoted in Hume 1970,133). Sayers noted similarly 
that each of the Bank rate increases of the early 1920s aroused “criticism 
on the grounds of aggravation of the trade depression” (1976, 129-39).  He 
went  on to observe that  this marked  “a new tide that was  destined to 
affect policy, or at least the atmosphere in which policy was taken, for the 
remainder of the decade.” Clearly, World War I was a watershed dividing 
the central bank autonomy of the nineteenth century from the more politi- 
cized monetary policy environment of the interwar years. 
The rise of the Labour Party, the growth of trade unionism,  and the 
prewar extension of the franchise had all worked to heighten this politici- 
zation. The 1920s were the years of the first Labour government, whose 
ministers were surely more sensitive to unemployment than their Conser- 
vative shadow counterparts. The unemployment problem acquired new 
prominence and not merely by virtue of its magnitude. It is important to 
understand that the concept of unemployment as an aggregate phenome- 
non, distinct from being unemployed as an individual condition, only be- 
came current as late as the 1880s and after. Before that, being unemployed 
was regarded more as an individual failing than as a possible corollary of 
national economic policy.’6  By  the 1920s, of course, things were very dif- 
ferent. 
The links from monetary policy to domestic economic outcomes had 
been highlighted by Keynes, of course, in “The Economic Consequences 
of Mr. Churchill,” where he asked, “By what modus operandi does credit 
restriction” reduce labor costs, increase competitiveness, and restore ex- 
ternal balance? “In no other way than by the deliberate intensification of 
unemployment” (1925, 16). Other well-known authors lent legitimacy to 
this view. As G. D. H. Cole wrote in the Morning Post  on 13 June 1924, 
“There is a Great God named Par who is worshiped daily at the Treasury 
and in the magnificent temples the big five are building on every street. 
Par likes unemployment; it is his form of human sacrifice. And on Par’s 
altars the Treasury daily burns incense in the form of currency and credit.” 
16. We refer readers to whom these arguments appear unfamiliar or implausible to Eichen- 
green and Hatton (1988). Currency Crisis and Unemployment: Sterling in 1931  19 
One can question the depth of comprehension of these points by the man 
in the street or the MP in the back benches, but there is no question that 
such rhetoric worked to heighten at least superficial awareness of the links 
between monetary policy and unemployment. 
Central bankers understood these links as well. In evidence to the Mac- 
millan Committee on Finance and Industry (today, a comparable body 
would be given a name like the “Committee on Monetary Policy and Un- 
employment”), Norman and Harvey, the Bank of England’s governor and 
deputy governor, were forced to defend their policies against the charge 
that these aggravated unemployment. Central bankers having every incen- 
tive to shroud themselves in ambiguity, there is no smoking gun-no  state- 
ment that “we are reluctant to raise interest rates and defend the sterling 
parity for fear of aggravating unemployment.” Still, their responses give 
away the game. Norman was first asked whether he took macroeconomic 
conditions-“the  industrial position”  in  contemporary  parlance-into 
account when raising or lowering Bank rate. In response, he gave a bit of 
ground. “I should answer by saying that we do have them in view, yes, but 
that the main consideration in connection with movements of the Bank 
Rate is the international consideration.” H. P.  Macmillan, the committee 
chairman, then asked whether a lower Bank rate would have eased the 
internal situation. Norman conceded the point: “I think the internal situa- 
tion would have been much easier over the last few years if the rate had 
been x per cent instead of y per cent, say 4 per cent instead of 6 per 
cent.” The chairman responded, “You mean there would have been less 
unemployment.” Norman acknowledged, “I think there would.” Keynes 
forced Norman to dig his hole deeper: “SO it is of the essence of the case 
that the bank-rate should have an important effect, that when it is raised 
it should have an effect in the direction of unemployment. That is what 
you want. Am I right?’ Norman was cornered: “Yes,” he replied, “I should 
think it was.” (See Sayers 1976, 178-80.) 
Contemporaries drew the obvious conclusion. As Fraser put it, “A dem- 
ocratic government . . . cannot shut its eyes to such things [to complaints 
that monetary policy was aggravating unemployment], and, consciously 
or subconsciously, the British Government were influenced by them, and 
so they chose the policy that would minimize social unrest” (1933, 113). 
Hawtrey was more prosaic: “To raise the rate when unemployment among 
insured work people had risen to 22 per cent. was surely to gild the lily. If, 
in the language of 1848, the price of the convertibility of the note was to 
be a further disemployment of labour, the position had become untenable. 
And in fact it had” (1938, 143). 
Subsequent generations  of historians have  generally agreed. Morton 
(1940) put it bluntly, that the Bank of England was constrained by the fear 
that a higher interest rate would worsen unemployment. Clay wrote that 
“the decline in employment and profits [following the onset of the depres- 20  Barry Eichengreen and Olivier Jeanne 
sion] intensified the criticism of the monetary policy with which Norman 
was associated” (1957, 363). Pollard is equally to the point. In his words, 
“It was, in part, the depth of the slump and the level of unemployment 
which inhibited the raising of the bank rate to panic heights” (1969, 226). 
Palyi, while critical of the Bank of England’s inaction, acknowledged that 
it  is attributable to  the unwillingness of  “a depression-ridden  country, 
with the number of unemployed rising from 1,455,000 at the end of 1929 
to 2,500,000 at the end of 1930 . . . to countenance a severe deflationary 
move” (1972,271). While he concluded that it would have been preferable 
for the British authorities to defend sterling rather than to cave in to do- 
mestic unemployment pressures, he admitted in a formulation that antic- 
ipates our model, that it is a question of “policy priorities.” Kunz’s con- 
clusions are similar. “With business already very depressed,” she wrote, 
“neither management nor labour nor their representatives in Parliament 
were willing to pay the price which such a high Bank rate would exact . . . 
in the prevailing investment climate either a large rise in Bank rate or a 
loss of gold would be interpreted as a sign of panic” (1987, 284). 
Thus primary  sources and the secondary literature alike support the 
view that the exchange rate peg, maintained in the face of a massive exter- 
nal disturbance, aggravated unemployment, while the rise in unemploy- 
ment limited the willingness of  the authorities to defend that exchange 
rate when it came under attack. Analyzing these issues further requires a 
formal model, to which we now turn. 
1.3  Model 
This section presents a model of currency crises in which the variable 
driving the crisis is unemployment. While this model will be  discussed 
mainly with reference to sterling’s interwar experience, it may be viewed 
more generally as an attempt to explore the logic of a particular class of 
currency crises, those in which unemployment is the key factor underlying 
the fragility of the currency.” This model may also provide insights into 
episodes of crisis in which unemployment, without being the main factor, 
played a role along with other more traditional fundamentals such as real 
overvaluation or the trade balance. 
Unemployment-based currency crises involve the interaction of two as- 
pects of the economy that are usually considered separately, the labor mar- 
ket  and the foreign exchange market. Accordingly, our model  has two 
parts, one describing the macrostructure of the economy and the other 
characterizing exchange rate policy. The macroeconomic part of the model 
is standard. The evolution of wages and prices is assumed to depend on 
17. This class arguably includes also the 1992 sterling crisis (Eichengreen and Hsieh 1996) 
and the 1992-93  French franc crisis (Jeanne 1997b). Currency Crisis and Unemployment: Sterling in 1931  21 
the unemployment rate through a traditional Phillips curve, and the unem- 
ployment rate is determined  by  the real wage and the real interest rate. 
The policy part of the model endogenizes exchange rate policy in the spirit 
of second-generation models of currency crises. The government decides 
whether to maintain the peg by minimizing a loss function that depends 
on the state of the economy.1s  The interesting properties of the model come 
from the two-way interaction of the two parts. While the level of unem- 
ployment affects the willingness of the government to defend the currency 
and so the credibility of the fixed peg, conversely the credibility of the 
fixed currency peg affects the level of domestic interest rates and economic 
activity. We study the response of the economy to an external deflationary 
shock  and show that it can fit a number  of  stylized facts of  sterling’s 
interwar experience. 
1.3.1  Assumptions 
employment, wage, and prices: 
The macroeconomic structure is summarized by three equations for un- 
(1)  u,  =  a,u,-, +  a2w,-, +  a,r, 9 
where u,,  w,,  p,,  pT, el,  o,  = w, -  p,, and r, = i,-, -  Ap, denote deviation of 
the unemployment rate from its natural level, nominal wage, domestic and 
foreign nominal prices, exchange rate, real wage, and ex post real interest 
rate, respectively, and A is the first-difference operator (Ax, = x, -  x,-,), 
With the exception of the interest rate, all variables are in logarithm. 
Equation (1) states that the unemployment rate is increasing with the 
level of the real wage and the ex post real interest rate.19  It is important to 
note that the monetary transmission channel at work here is different from 
the standard one. The interest rate appearing on the right-hand side is 
the ex post real interest rate, not the ex ante real interest rate r; = i, - 
E,(Ap,+J. A rise in the ex  post real interest  rate can depress economic 
activity by redistributing purchasing power from debtors to creditors, an 
idea originally put forward by Irving Fisher in his debt deflation theory of 
the Great Depression  and referred to as the “balance sheet channel of 
18. The government’s loss function  depends  on the unemployment  rate, as in Jeanne 
(1997b). The model in Jeanne’s paper does not include, however, wage or price equations. 
19. The assumption that the real wage enters with one lag simplifies the computations but 
is not crucial for the results. Adding the real exchange rate q, =  p, -  (p: + e,)  to the determi- 
nants of unemployment would not change significantly the properties of the model, since by 
eqs. (2) and (3) variations in the real exchange rate are proportional to those of the real wage 
under the fixed peg. 22  Barry Eichengreen and Olivier Jeanne 
monetary policy” in the modern literature (see, e.g., Bernanke and Gert- 
ler 1995).20 
Equation (2) is a naive Phillips curve, which takes the rate of wage infla- 
tion as increasing with the rate of change of the domestic price and de- 
creasing with the unemployment rate. This relation is not constrained by 
the hypothesis that wage setters have rational expectations, a hypothesis 
that seems difficult to reconcile with the extreme nominal stickiness of 
wages in the interwar United Kingdom.z1  Equation (3) states that the do- 
mestic price level is a weighted average of the domestic wage and the cost 
of imported goods. Hereafter we  assume that the foreign inflation rate, 
Ap*, is constant. 
We  assume that the home country is initially committed to a fixed ex- 
change rate arrangement designed to maintain the nominal exchange rate 
at a constant level. This commitment is not irreversible, however. In each 
period, the government may invoke an escape clause and devalue the cur- 
rency by  an exogenous amount d. We  denote by  nTT,  the probability esti- 
mated at t of a devaluation at t + 1. This is an important variable, which 
reflects the lack of credibility of the peg. 
We assume that the domestic and foreign interest rates satisfy uncovered 
interest parity and that foreign exchange market participants form their 
expectations in a rational way. Under the fixed peg, the expected rate of 
depreciation is equal to the devaluation  probability  times the expected 
amount of the devaluation, and interest parity may be written 
(4)  i,  =  i*  +  n,d. 
The foreign nominal interest rate, i*,  satisfies the Fisher relation: 
(5)  i*  =  r* +  Ap*, 
where r*, the foreign real interest rate, is assumed to be constant. 
The government decides whether to devalue by considering a trade-off 
between its internal and external objectives. We assume that devaluation 
makes it possible to reduce unemployment by an amount AU,*~  but entails 
costs for the government. Some of these costs are borne by  the policy- 
20. Introducing the ex ante real interest rate in the unemployment equation is possible but 
would complicate the analysis of the equilibrium. The ex ante real interest rate in a given 
period depends on the market expectations of the government’s decision at the following 
period, which themselves depend on the next-period expectations. By  forward induction, the 
equilibrium depends on the expectations over the infinite horizon. Models of currency crises 
of this kind have been studied by  Krugman (1996) and Jeanne and Masson (2000). 
21. This does not mean that all agents have adaptive expectations:  we  assume that the 
expectations of foreign exchange market participants are rational. 
22. A devaluation can reduce the unemployment rate by  improving competitiveness, re- 
ducing the real wage (if the nominal wage is sticky), or allowing the government to set lower 
interest rates. While we do not model these channels explicitly, those relying on the wage and 
the interest rate are consistent with the unemployment eq. (1). Currency Crisis and Unemployment: Sterling in 1931  23 
maker responsible for the devaluation, others by the country as a whole. 
In the case of  the United Kingdom, devaluation might hasten sterling’s 
loss of international currency status, dealing a blow not only to national 
pride but also to seigniorage revenue and the importance of London as a 
financial center. 
Formally, we  assume that the government decides to opt out or not so 
as to minimize a loss function that depends on the deviation of unemploy- 
ment from its natural level and on the opting-out 
(6)  L,  =  24:  +  qc,, 
where 6, = 1 if  it devalues (zero otherwise). We  assume that the opting- 
out cost C,  follows an identically and independently distributed stochastic 
process. The stochastic nature of the opting-out cost may  reflect unpre- 
dictable events in the social or political spheres, such as an election, the 
collapse of a political coalition, or a strike, that raise or lower domestic 
resistance to devaluation. We  assume that the policy-making process can 
be in two states with different expected opting-out  In state 1 the 
opting-out cost is given by  C, = C, + q,;  in state 2 it is  C, = C, + E,~, 
where E, and E,  are i.i.d. normal shocks. The state with the lower C corre- 
sponds to a political or social situation that makes devaluation more likely. 
At any given period there is a probability 1/2 that the policy-making pro- 
cess is in state 1 and 1/2 that it is in state 2. 
1.3.2  Reduced-Form Dynamics 
Substituting out nominal variables from the structural equations yields 
the following reduced form for the dynamics of the unemployment and 
real wage rates: 
where B = (bii)i.j=,,2,  a  = (aI,aJ,  P = (P1,PJr1  and Y = (yI,yz)’  are a 2 X 2 
matrix and vectors, the coefficients of which depend on the structural pa- 
rameters of the model (see the appendix). Equation (7) provides a conve- 
nient decomposition of the effects at work in the model. The first term on 
the right-hand side characterizes the adjustment of the economy toward 
23. The loss function is instantaneous, i.e., not intertemporal. This assumption greatly 
simplifies the analysis, in particular because it allows us to characterize the dynamics of 
unemployment before a devaluation without making any assumption about the exchange 
rate regime following the devaluation. Since the opting-out cost may be interpreted as the 
discounted sum of expected flow costs, the myopia implied by eq. (6) is limited to unemploy- 
ment. This may reflect the fact that voters determine their votes on the basis of the current 
unemployment rate or that the policymaker stays in office for a short time. 
24. This assumption, while not necessary for the main properties of the model, is useful 
for estimation. 24  Barry Eichengreen and Olivier Jeanne 
equilibrium when there are no foreign disturbances and the credibility of 
the exchange rate peg is perfect. The second and third terms correspond 
to the effects of foreign rates of interest  and inflation on the domestic 
economy, the last term to credibility effects. 
The devaluation probability is an endogenous variable of the model. It 
equals the probability that the benefit of devaluation in terms of reduced 
unemployment will exceed the opting-out cost in the next period. This 
probability is between zero and one, since the opting-out cost is stochas- 
tic,2s  and it depends on the level of unemployment. Because the govern- 
ment’s loss function is convex in the unemployment rate, the incentive to 
devalue is stronger the higher the level of unemployment. It is shown in 
the appendix that the government’s optimal decision is to devalue if the 
unemployment rate implied by the fixed exchange rate goes beyond a criti- 
cal level and that the devaluation probability, nf,  may be written 
(8)  nf  =  II(b,,u, +  h,2~t  +  (Y,Y*  +  p,Ap*), 
where II(*)  is an increasing function.26  The intuition behind equation (8) 
is that the devaluation probability is increasing with the next-period unem- 
ployment rate, which in turn is  a function of the current values of the 
unemployment rate, the real wage, and the foreign real interest rate. 
The dynamics of the economy are characterized by equations (7) and 
(8). The main question of interest, for our purposes, is how the domestic 
economy responds to external shocks, in particular to changes in the for- 
eign inflation rate, Ap*. The response of the economy involves the labor, 
financial, and foreign exchange markets and the spillovers across these 
markets. The linkage from currency to labor is characterized by equation 
(7): devaluation expectations tend to generate unemployment by  raising 
the real interest rate. Conversely, as equation (8) shows, a rise in unemploy- 
ment or the real wage weakens the credibility of the fixed peg. This two- 
way interaction of the labor and foreign exchange markets is likely to affect 
the stability of the fixed exchange rate peg. 
First, consider a steady state in which unemployment, the real wage, 
and the devaluation probability remain constant at levels denoted by U,  0, 
and TT.27 It is shown in the appendix that 
25. The opting-out cost is the only source of uncertainty in this model, but it would not 
be difficult to add shocks in the structural eqs. (l), (2), and (3). 
26. Note that the model may give rise to multiple equilibria, in which case the function 
II(.)  is  not  well  defined. The multiplicity  of  equilibria,  a  generic  property  of  second- 
generation models of currency crises, has been exploited by a number of authors to discuss 
self-fulfilling  speculation (see, e.g., Obstfeld 1996; Velasco 1996; Jeanne 1997a). A discussion 
of this issue in the context of the present model may be found in the appendix. 
27. The steady state properties we describe below are not long-run properties of the econ- 
omy. In general the steady state devaluation probability is strictly positive, so that the domes- 
tic government devalues sooner or later with probability one. Currency Crisis and Unemployment:  Sterling in 1931  29 
(9) 
The domestic economy is sensitive to the foreign inflation rate because of 
nominal wage stickiness, the extent of which is measured by  1 -  a4. For- 
eign deflation, say,  generates upward pressure in the real wage  and in- 
creases unemployment, leading to a rise in devaluation expectations. An 
increase in the foreign real interest rate depresses the real wage in the long 
run by exerting upward pressure on unemployment. 
The dynamics of the economy out of the steady state are complicated 
by  their nonlinearity, but we  can make some qualitative statements. In 
particular, it is easy to see that the devaluation expectations contribute to 
increase the persistence of unemployment. This persistence is the sum of 
two terms: 
au,+l  =  b,, +  Y,b,,  n’. 
3% 
The first term reflects structural persistence mechanisms that are indepen- 
dent of exchange rate policy. The second term comes from the exchange 
rate regime: an increase in unemployment in the current period raises the 
interest rate premium and the unemployment rate in the following periods. 
To  illustrate, the dynamics of the unemployment and real wage rates 
can be represented in (w, u)-space for different degrees of credibility of the 
fixed peg (corresponding to different levels of the opting-out cost, C).  In 
figure 1.6 we  show how the economy converges to its steady state starting 
from an excessive real wage for two different degrees of credibility. In both 
cases the dynamics are stable, but they have very different shapes. When 
the peg is less credible, the real wage has to fall by a larger amount before 
unemployment starts to decline. As a result the unemployment rate scales 
higher levels and remains at those for longer, further weakening the cur- 
rency. 
1.3.3  External Shocks and Currency Crisis 
In this subsection, we  argue that external shocks, such as a change in 
the foreign inflation or interest rate, can reproduce some key features of 
the behavior of the U.K.  economy in the interwar years, including the 
sterling crisis. 
Assume that starting from a steady state with a constant foreign price 
level, the foreign inflation rate jumps from zero to Ap* < 0. In the first 
period after the shock, imported deflation raises the real wage and un- 26  Barry Eichengreen and Olivier Jeanne 
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Fig. 1.6  Dynamics of unemployment and real wage 
employment.  From our steady state analysis, we  know that the unem- 
ployment rate will converge toward a higher level, which progressively ex- 
erts downward pressure on the wage. Whether the long-term real wage is 
higher or lower than its initial level depends on the parameters. As the 
unemployment rate increases, devaluation expectations begin to rise. And 
because the relation between the unemployment rate and the devaluation 
probability is nonlinear, devaluation expectations may rise very little at 
first, but jump upward when unemployment reaches a critical level. An 
example of these dynamics is shown in figure 1.7. 
1.4  Estimation 
We estimated the model on monthly data for the period 19255-36:12, 
a sample covering sterling’s participation in the interwar gold standard 
and the following five years. The choice of a sample period extending after 
the devaluation was dictated by our desire to analyze not only the period 
leading up to the sterling crisis but its consequences. 
The unemployment, wage, and price equations were estimated using as 
many as six lags of each variable, with an instrument for the current values Currency Crisis and Unemployment: Sterling in 1931  27 
of explanatory variables in order to avoid simultaneous equation bias. One 
term for each variable turned out to be sufficient, and current-period val- 
ues were never significant. The exogeneity assumption could not be re- 
jected using Hausman tests, which is not surprising given that we use rel- 
atively high frequency data. As an additional check, we  also report the 
results of two-stage least squares estimation. 
Details about sources and definitions are found in the appendix. We 
took the logarithms of all variables except the interest rate and the devalu- 
ation probability. 
1.4.1  Unemployment Equation 
The explanatory variables for this equation are the real wage, the real 
interest rate, and the lagged unemployment rate. The real wage is defined 
as the (log of the) nominal wage divided by the CPI. Since there are gener- 
ally thought to be lags in the transmission of  interest rates to economic 
activity, we  measured  the real interest  rate as a moving average of  the 
three-month nominal interest rate net of CPI inflation over the preceding 
twelve months. 
Results of OLS estimation are shown in table 1.1. The full specification 
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Table 1.1  Unemployment Equation 































0.315  0.305 
(0.136) 
0.931  0.933 
(0.028) 
0.333  0.293 
(0.158) 





Nore: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The coefficients for the real interest rate 
and the real exchange rate have been multiplied by  100. 
cantly different from zero. Removing it (as in col. [2]) does not change the 
other results. Column (3) reports the results of two-stage least squares es- 
timation, which are not significantly different from those of OLS.**  A Chow 
test provides no evidence of a structural break following Britain’s depar- 
ture from gold; testing for a break in September 1931 yields F(4,127) = 
1.082, well below the 10 percent significance level. The coefficients on the 
real wage and the real interest rate are significant and positive, as antici- 
pated. Permanent changes in these variables have little impact in the short 
run but sizable effects in the long run due to the persistence of unemploy- 
ment. The long-term elasticity of the unemployment rate with respect to 
the real wage is 4.43, implying that a permanent 1 percent increase in the 
real wage raises unemployment from, say, 10 percent to 10.44 percent in 
the long run. A permanent  1 percent rise in the real interest rate raises 
unemployment from 10 to 10.74 percent. 
The statistical significance of these results should be qualified by  the 
fact that the variables in this equation are not clearly stationary. An aug- 
mented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test with six lags does not reject a unit root 
in unemployment, the real wage, and the real interest rate at the 10 percent 
level. The importance one should give to nonstationarity,  as always, is 
debatable: on theoretical grounds, unemployment and the real interest rate 
should be stationary, and while a unit root in the real wage could be attrib- 
28. We used two lags of unemployment, the real wage, and the real interest rate as instru- 
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Table 1.2  Wage Equation 
Dependent Variable: Change in Nominal Wage (Aw) 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Constant (X lo2)  0.181  2.519  2.999  2.495 
(0.190)  (0.71  I)  (0.71 1)  (0.732) 
AP-~  (XlO’)  4.900  5.158  8.817  5.157 
(1.950)  (1.878)  (2.325)  (1.878) 
(0.071)  (0.084)  (0.085)  (0.085) 
b (X lo2)  0.934  1.099  0.924 
(0.275)  (0.276)  (0.283) 




0.041  0.111  0.147  0.111 
1.946  2.112  2.136  2.1 12 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. All coefficients are multiplied by  100 
uted to technological progress, it is actually due to price deflation in our 
data. There is some evidence that unemployment, the real wage, and the 
real interest rate are c~integrated,~~  which allows us to estimate the unem- 
ployment equation as an error correction model: the results are reported 
in column (4) of table 1.1. The estimated coefficients are not significantly 
different from those obtained from OLS, except that for the real interest 
rate, which is lower. 
Previous authors estimating models of the interwar economy have ob- 
tained broadly similar results. Dimsdale and Horsewood (1995) reported a 
quarterly equation for employment rather than unemployment, obtaining 
rather similar real wage coefficients up to a sign change.30  Also using quar- 
terly data, Hatton (1988) found a significant negative effect of the real 
wage (lagged twice) on employment.  Beenstock and Warburton  (1986) 
found small but statistically significant effects of real wages on both labor 
supply and labor demand. Broadberry’s (1983) estimates of labor supply 
and demand provide less support for the importance of real wages, al- 
though his sample is limited to fifteen annual observations for the period 
1924-38. 
1.4.2  Wage Equation 
Results are in table I .2. Those in column (1) limit the set of explanatory 
variables to inflation and unemployment, as in the simple Phillips curve 
of the model. The coefficient on inflation, while significant, is low, imply- 
29. The ADF t-test applied to the residuals of the cointegrating regression (as described 
30. They include two lags of the real wage and normalize money wages by the GDP de- 
by  Hamilton 1994, 599) rejects the absence of cointegration at the 10 percent level. 











Fig. 1.8  Real unemployment benefit (blp) 
ing that less than 5 percent of price variation is reflected in the nominal 
wage. The unemployment rate, on the other hand, is not significant. The 
weak explanatory power of the equation is consistent with the conclusion 
of authors such as Sargan (1964) and Hatton (1988) that a simple Phil- 
lips curve performs poorly for the interwar years, a period during which 
prices and unemployment  fluctuated widely but  nominal wages moved 
sluggishly. 
A standard treatment of this problem is to add the replacement rate 
(the ratio of unemployment benefits to wages) as a shift variable for un- 
employment. In theory, in the presence of unemployment benefits, wage 
setters place less weight on employment and more weight on the level of 
compensation when setting the reservation wage. Indeed, Britain had a 
relatively generous  unemployment  insurance  system between  the wars 
(Burns 1941), and previous authors utilizing the level of  benefits in time- 
series estimation tend to identify a large effect, albeit somewhat smaller in 
more recent studies (contrast Benjamin and Kochin 1979 with Dimsdale 
and Horsewood 1995). But the sharp increase in the real level of benefits 
when price levels fell in the Great Depression (fig. 1.8) admits of alterna- 
tive interpretations: is the coefficient on the real benefit really capturing 
the impact of more generous benefits on job search, or is it in fact picking Currency Crisis and Unemployment: Sterling in 1931  31 
up the effects on unemployment of the collapse of prices and demand that 
set in starting in  1929? Be this as it may, the elasticity of long-run equilib- 
rium unemployment with respect to the benefit is  3.84, implying that a 
1 percent increase in  the benefit is sufficient to raise the natural rate of 
unemployment from 10 to 10.4 percent, an effect only about half the size 
of that obtained by Dimsdale and Horse~ood.~’  With the addition of the 
benefit  variable, the coefficient on unemployment is  now  significant as 
well, and the coefficient on lagged prices, plausibly, is larger than before. 
A Chow test provides some evidence of a structural break in September 
1931: F(4, 129) = 2.895, which is significant at the 5 percent  This 
is due to a fall in the elasticity of wages with respect to prices after the de- 
valuation of sterling in 1931. (It is impossible to reject the null of no struc- 
tural break in the other coefficients.)  On its face, the direction of this change 
is surprising: following Alogoskoufis and Smith (1 99 l), one would expect 
wages  to respond less powerfully to prices under a fixed exchange rate, 
when  the price level should show stronger mean reversion, than under a 
floating rate, when it is likely to exhibit greater persistence. A possible 
reconciliation is that wage setters anticipated the persistent deflation that 
characterized the relatively restrictive global monetary environment of the 
interwar gold standard and in contrast did not expect the Bank of En- 
gland to make powerful reflationary use of monetary policy once the gold 
standard was abandoned.33  Column (3) reports the result when the co- 
efficient for price inflation is allowed to differ before and after the sterling 
crisis, as suggested by the results of this stability test. Column (4) reports 
the results of two-stage least squares estimation. 
While the rates of change of wages and prices are stationary, unemploy- 
ment and real benefits are not, and an ADF t-test does not produce any 
evidence of cointegration between them. Thus the strategy of estimating 
the equation as an error correction model, which we  implemented in the 
case of the unemployment equation, is impossible here. We  tried to solve 
this  problem  in  several ways-distinguishing  between  short-term  and 
long-term unemployment (as in  Crafts  1989), adding Bain  and  Price’s 
(1980) annual index of union membership density to the explanatory vari- 
ables, and adding a time trend-but  still found no evidence of cointegra- 
ti~n.~~ 
31. The long-run or “natural” rate of unemployment is that consistent with zero wage and 
price inflation. 
32. This result contrasts with Hatton (1988), who found no evidence of a structural break 
in his wage equation estimates on quarterly data. 
33. This is consistent with interpretations that emphasize the reluctance of central banks 
to make aggressive use of reflationary monetary policy following the abandonment of  the 
gold standard (e.g., Eichengreen 1992). 
34. This prompted us to reestimate the entire model as an unrestricted vector autoregres- 
sion in the differenced variables; we discuss these results below. Fortunately, the main results 
were not changed. 32  Barry Eichengreen and Olivier Jeanne 
Table 1.3  Price Equation 
Dependent Variable: CPI Inflation (Ap) 
Constant (X lo3)  -0.609 
(0.853) 
Aw  I  0.374  0.733  0.762  0.731 
(0.340)  (0.057)  (0.060)  (0.057) 
w,  0.255  0.267  0.238  0.269 
(0.058)  (0.057)  (0.060)  (0.057) 
R2  0.119  0.122  0.560  0.125 
DW  1.548  1.573  1.948  1.580 
Note: Variable p" denotes the wholesale price index. Numbers in parentheses are standard 
errors. The constant has been multiplied by  1,000. 
1.4.3  Price Equation 
In our model, the rate of change of the CPI is a weighted average of the 
rates of  change of  the nominal wage and the cost of imported factors of 
production.  Following Capie and Collins (1983), we  use  the wholesale 
price  index, which  is dominated  by  internationally traded  goods,  as a 
proxy for the latter. The unrestricted regression is given in column (1) of 
table 1.3. The wage and import price coefficients are both positive as ex- 
pected, as in such previous work as that of Dimsdale et al. (1989). It is 
impossible to reject the joint hypothesis that the constant is zero and that 
the coefficients for the nominal wage and the CPI sum to unity, as antic- 
ipated.  These restrictions  are imposed in column (2). Now  the greater 
weight is placed on the wage component, as predicted by neoclassical pro- 
duction and pricing theory. In view  of  the low Durbin-Watson  statistic, 
we also estimated this equation under the assumption of an MA( 1) error, 
but this did not alter the result significantly (see col. [3]). Evidence of a 
structural break is weak; a Chow test yields F( 1,136) = 2.762, which is mar- 
ginally significant at the 10 percent level. To the extent that there is evi- 
dence of a break, this takes the form of  a lower weight on import prices 
and a correspondingly  higher weight on wages after sterling's devalua- 
ti~n.~~  As column (4) shows, the two-stage least squares estimates are not 
significantly different from those of OLS. 
1.4.4  Devaluation Probability 
The model specifies the devaluation probability as a nonlinear function 
of the unemployment  rate. We  estimated this equation using nonlinear 
35. This may in turn reflect the collapse of international trade and Britain's imposition of 
a general tariff in  1932, which  could have reduced  the weight of  imported inputs in  the 
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Table 1.4  Devaluation Expectation Equation 
Dependent Variable: 
Variable  Devaluation Probability (T) 
VI  10.922 
(8.253) 
(4.295) 
Vl  4.343 
V2  3.153 
(0.020) 
u2  0.032 
(0.016) 
Nore: Table reports estimation of eq. (12). Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
least squares over the period 1925:5-31% Estimation requires an empiri- 
cal measure of the dependent variable; this was obtained using the drift- 
adjustment method under the assumption that the expected magnitude of 
devaluation was 10 percent. 
The specification takes the devaluation probability as equal to the pre- 
dicted value plus a forecast error: 
(12)  n,  =  %F&+l  - v,)  +  %Fo2(U,+,  - v2) +  rlr7 
where F,(.)  is the cumulative of a normal distribution with variance IT* 
(see the appendix). 
The results are reported in table 1.4 and figure 1.9.  While the model does 
not explain month-to-month fluctuations in the devaluation probability, it 
does capture the sharp increase in devaluation expectations toward the 
end of the estimation period, coinciding with the sterling crisis. 
1.5  Causes of the Sterling Crisis 
The results of section 1.4 are consistent with the view that the proximate 
cause of the sterling crisis was the dramatic rise in unemployment in 1929- 
3  1. The model is compatible with a number of different interpretations of 
this rise. These include the rise in real interest rates when the worldwide 
deflation set in starting in 1929 and the fall in the price of imported goods 
once world price levels began to plummet. These external disturbances 
affected the real economy through their interaction with slowly adjusting 
nominal wages and unemployment benefits. In addition, in our model the 
impact of external shocks is amplified by  the response of financial mar- 
kets:  the  rise  in  unemployment  increases the  exchange risk  premium, 
further elevating domestic interest  rates  and further depressing unem- 
ployment. The question is how much weight to attach to these different 
elements. To shed some light on it, we  ran three counterfactual simula- 
tions, one that indexed unemployment benefits, one that eliminated the 34  Barry Eichengreen and OIivier Jeanne 
interest rate shock, and one that eliminated imported deflation.36  This ex- 
ercise requires some assumptions about the path that would have been 
followed by the wholesale price index and the real interest rate had Britain 
not gone off  gold. We assumed that the variations in the wholesale price 
index would have been the same in the United Kingdom as in France, 
which maintained its gold peg until 1936, and the real interest rate was set 
at a constant level equal to its average value over the fixed rate period. 
Counterfactual I: Indexing Unemployment Benefits. Figure 1.10 shows the 
evolution of the unemployment rate and the devaluation probability over 
the period  1925532:  12 under the assumption that real unemployment 
benefits were held constant at their 1925:5 level. The unemployment rate 
exhibits the same upward march as in the historical data, and by mid-1932 
the devaluation probability jumps to a level of the same order of mag- 
nitude as during the sterling crisis. This suggests that the sterling crisis 
might have been postponed by a few months had unemployment benefits 
been indexed but that the course of this history would have been little 
changed otherwise. 
36. These simulations are run using the equations in col. (2) of table 1.1, col. (3) of table 
1.2, and col. (3) of table 1.3  and the equation in table 1.4. Currency Crisis and Unemployment: Sterling in 1931  35 
Counterfactual 2: No Interest Rate Shock. Figure 1.1  1 shows the evolution 
of unemployment  with the world real interest rate held constant at its 
1928:12 level. The effect of removing the interest rate shock on unemploy- 
ment is large but transitory. The unemployment rate would have been 4 
percentage points lower than in the historical data in the summer of 1931. 
It would have grown at a quicker pace afterward, however, so that sterling 
would have been devalued at the beginning of 1934. 
Counterfactuul 3: No Imported Deflution. Figure 1.12 shows the unemploy- 
ment rate and devaluation probability holding the price of imported goods 
constant at its May 1925 level. The unemployment rate is now 6 percent- 
age points lower in mid-1931 than in the historical  data and decreases 
afterward. As a result the sterling crisis would have been permanently post- 
poned. 
The reader may worry that our counterfactual results hinge too sensitively 
on the structural assumptions of our model or the estimation method. 
In order to check this, we  reestimated the model as an unrestricted  vec- 
tor autoregression in the differenced variables with six lags and included 
the residuals  of  the cointegrating relation  between unemployment,  the 
real wage, and the real interest rate as an error correction term. Again, we 
found that removing the real interest rate shock would have postponed 
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would have postponed it permanently. This confirms that imported defla- 
tion was the main factor driving the rise in unemployment that in turn 
precipitated the sterling crisis. 
1.6  Conclusion 
In this paper we have analyzed currency crises in a model of unemploy- 
ment, where the two-way interaction of devaluation expectations and un- 
employment gives rise to a rich set of dynamic possibilities. In our model, 
unemployment can heighten devaluation  expectations, given the knowl- 
edge that the government may be prepared to pay the costs of opting out 
of its exchange rate commitment when a high level of joblessness increases 
the urgency it attaches to the pursuit of reflationary policies. Heightened 
devaluation expectations can in turn increase unemployment by adding a 
devaluation premium to interest rates. It is straightforward to see how an 
external shock can have a major impact through these feedback effects on 
both unemployment and the stability of the currency. 
We have presented qualitative and quantitative evidence supporting this 
interpretation  of the  193  1 sterling crisis. Qualitative accounts, for their 
part, lay considerable weight on the pressure that a high and rising unem- 
ployment rate placed on British governments to pursue policies designed 
to stimulate recovery from the Great Depression, and on how the reluc- 
tance of those governments to raise interest rates in the face of speculative 
pressure undermined confidence in their commitment to the maintenance 
of the sterling parity. Our econometric estimates and simulations provide 
quantitative support for this interpretation. They suggest that the  193  1 
sterling crisis should be understood in terms of the pressure brought to 
bear on fragile governments by large foreign shocks superimposed on less 
than credible domestic policy commitments. We  suspect  that a similar 




substitute out the nominal wage gives 
Taking the first difference of equation  (3) and using equation (2) to 
1 - Q, 
1 - a,a,  Ap,  = -  %I  +  Ap*. 
'5'6 
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Equation (2) gives an expression for the rate of change of the real wage 
Aw,  =  Aw, - Ap,  = -(1 - a,)Ap, - U~M,-~, 
which, using the equation for Ap,, may be written like the reduced-form 
equation for the real wage given in equation (7) with 
(A6)  y2  =  0. 
Using r, = it-, -  Ap, = r* + Ap* + d.rr,-, -  Apt to substitute out the real 
interest rate in equation (l),  the unemployment equation may be rewritten 
Ap* +  u3d.rrl-,.  +  - ‘4>‘6 
1 - U4U6 
Whence the reduced-form equation for unemployment is given by  equa- 
tion (7) with 
Devaluation Probability 
u:+, > 
The government devalues if this lowers the loss function (6); that is, 
-  Au12 + Cr+,,  or 
M,,~ >  +  AM , 
2 0  AM Currency Crisis and Unemployment: Sterling in 1931  39 
where u,,~  is the unemployment rate at t + 1 conditional on no devalua- 
tion. The right-hand side of this inequality is the threshold level of unem- 
ployment above which the government prefers to devalue. 
The devaluation probability at t is equal to the probability that the next- 
period unemployment rate (conditional on no devaluation) is above the 
threshold triggering a devaluation; that is, 
where F(.) is the cumulative distribution function of (lR)(C,,,/Au  + Au). 
Given our assumptions about the stochastic process followed by  the 
opting-out cost, F(.) takes the form 
(A 14)  F(u)  =  %Fu,(u  - .I)  + %F& - V2)> 
where Fuk(')  is the cumulative of a normal distribution of variance 4  = 
Var(ck)/4Au2  and vk = Ck/2Au + Ad2 (k = 1,2). 
Using the reduced form (7) to substitute out u~+~,  one obtains a rela- 
tion between the devaluation probability and current macroeconomic var- 
iables: 
(A15)  nl  =  F(bllu,  +  b,2co, +  air* +  p,Ap* +  -ylnl). 
This equation implicitly defines nt as a function of the economic funda- 
mentals u, and w,. Note that the right-hand side is increasing with n, and 
may thus intersect the left-hand side in several points. If this is the case 
the devaluation probability is not determined uniquely by  the economic 
fundamentals, and the beliefs of foreign exchange market participants may 
become self-fulfilling. The logic of this multiplicity is that high devalua- 
tion expectations validate themselves by increasing unemployment in the 
home country. 
A sufficient condition for uniqueness is that the slope of the right-hand 
side of equation (A1  5) be everywhere lower than one; that is, 
(A 16)  y,maxF'  <  1. 
If the condition above is  satisfied, the devaluation probability is given 
by equation (8), where function II(-)  is increasing and satisfies lim-JI  = 
0 and lim+JI  = 1. 
Steady States 
In steady state the real wage is constant: 
(A 17)  Aw,  =  b21U  + p,Ap*  =  0, 
so that the steady state level of unemployment is given by equation (9). 40  Barry Eichengreen and Olivier Jeanne 
In steady state the reduced-form equation for unemployment is 
(A 18) 
which, using equation (9), implies (10). 
Data 
All  data are monthly, from  May  1925 to December  1936. Many are 
extracted from  the International Abstract  of Economic  Stutistics (IAES 
1934) for the period 1925-30  and the Recueil International de Statistiques 
Economiques (RISE 1938) for the period 1931-36. 









Percentage  of  insured  persons  unemployed,  males  and  females 
(IAES+RISE, Great Britain). 
Index of average weekly wages (IAES+RISE, Great Britain). 
Cost of living index (IAES+  RISE, Great Britain). 
Wholesale price index (IAES+ RISE, Great Britain). 
U.K. three-month nominal interest rate (Einzig 1937, app. 111). 
US. three-month nominal interest rate (Einzig 1937, app. 111,  New 
York). 
U.S. consumer price index (Sayre 1948, table 1, column “All items”). 
Dollar-sterling exchange rate (IAES+RISE, United States). 
Weighted index of benefit rates (Burns 1941, 368). Weights are the 
same as in Hatton (1 988). 
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Comment  Michael D. Bordo 
In this fascinating paper, Eichengreen and Jeanne extend the logic of the 
recent second-generation currency crisis models to explain the sterling cri- 
sis of 1931, a crisis that precipitated  the demise of the interwar gold ex- 
change standard. In simplest terms, the story they tell is that the United 
Kingdom abandoned gold convertibility on 20 September  193  1 because 
the monetary authorities were unwilling to raise the discount rate suffi- 
ciently to defend convertibility. The authorities were concerned that such 
actions would increase the level of  unemployment from its already high 
level. The explanation works through a model in which the monetary au- 
thority has a loss function that balances the costs of rising unemployment 
against the costs of lost credibility (including the benefits from sterling’s 
role as a reserve currency and London’s position as a financial center). 
As unemployment rises the costs of abandoning convertibility decline 
relative to the political costs of not doing so. Exchange market partici- 
pants understand  this, so that  the probability  of devaluation  increases. 
The level of unemployment is driven by the external shocks of the Great 
Depression via two channels: the effect of deflation on real wages in the 
face of nominal rigidities and the effect of deflation on ex post real interest 
rates via a credit market channel. Estimating the model and solving for 
the probability  of  devaluation  gives the result of a marked jump in the 
probability of devaluation in the late summer of  193  1,  thus anticipating 
the crisis. A counterfactual displayed in figure 1.12 shows that in the ab- 
sence of the external deflationary  shocks of the Great Depression,  the 
probability of sterling devaluation in 193  1 would have been negligible. 
The model is neat, easy to understand, and, if you believe the assump- 
tions on which it is based, very compelling. The problem is that I am not 
convinced that it was the authorities’ concern over rising unemployment 
that led them to throw in the towel on parity at $4.86. This is not to say 
that it was not the shocks of the Great Depression that pushed the United 
Kingdom over the edge. 
My first concern is over the issue of credibility. It is not obvious that 
the 1992 U.K. loss function-that  the authorities were unwilling to persist 
Michael D. Bordo is professor of economics at Rutgers University and a research associate 
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in maintaining a high Bank rate to defend sterling during the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism  crisis because  of the effects high interest  rates would 
have on mortgage rates and the level of unemployment-applies  to the 
United Kingdom in 193  1. 
The interwar gold standard was  an attempt to reconstruct (although 
modified into a gold exchange standard) the pre-World  War I classical 
gold standard. That regime, for the United Kingdom and other key play- 
ers, was based on a credible commitment to gold parity. One can view the 
gold standard as a contingent rule, as I do in an article with Finn Kydland 
(Bordo and Kydland  1995) and as Eichengreen does in his recent book 
Globalizing Capital (1 996). Under the rule, member countries stick to gold 
parity except in  the event of a well-understood  dire emergency, such as 
a war. In that case, you abandon convertibility  and follow expansionary 
financial policies on the understanding that after the emergency is over 
you go back to gold at the previous parity. Another contingency, which is 
less clear-cut, is  a financial crisis-not  one produced  by  the monetary 
authorities’ own actions-that  is, a domestic banking crisis and a currency 
crisis together  (referred  to in an earlier literature  as an internal and an 
external drain). In that case, you temporarily leave gold, as was the case 
for a number of crises in the nineteenth century when the Bank of England 
invoked a Treasury Letter. Rising unemployment  was not one of those 
contingencies. It was not in the loss function. When unemployment went 
up, people emigrated to North America or Australia. 
After World War I, the United Kingdom returned to gold at the prewar 
parity of $4.86. To do so, it put the British economy through the wringer. 
The return to gold reflected the victory  of the “City” view that  only a 
return to the original parity would recapture the credibility of the prewar 
regime and the benefits that accrued to the City of London. Keynes and 
others opposed the policy, but they represented a minority position. 
Evidence  provided  by  a  number  of  scholars,  including  Eichengreen 
(1992), suggests that the interwar gold exchange standard, at least the dol- 
lar-sterling exchange rate, was indeed credible at least up to the summer 
of  1931. So the question that arises is, What changed between  1925 and 
1931 to justify using a late-twentieth-century loss function instead of the 
nineteenth-century  loss function  that  lay behind  the  1925 resumption? 
True, Eichengreen in Golden Fetters (1992) and in section 1.2 of this paper 
discusses the growing power  of the labor movement,  universal  suffrage, 
the rise of socialism, and so forth. But to make the case for this paper, the 
authors need to come up with more convincing qualitative evidence than 
the “hints” that are given in section 1.2 that the U.K. monetary authorities 
in the period  under consideration  viewed rising unemployment  increas- 
ingly as their primary objective. 
My reading of the history of the crisis, based on Sayers (1976), Cairn- Currency Crisis and Unemployment: Sterling in 1931  45 
cross and Eichengreen (1983), and others, is that it is not clear that rising 
unemployment and the unwillingness to raise Bank rate because of what it 
would do to unemployment was the key reason for the crisis. The literature 
focuses on two other factors. The first is the basic overvaluation of sterling 
since 1925 and the resultant weakness in the current account of the bal- 
ance of payments. Thus the United Kingdom was continuously threatened 
with being forced off  the gold standard for an old-fashioned first-gener- 
ation currency crisis model reason. Indeed, two earlier sterling crises, in 
1927 and 1929, when unemployment did not spike above its interwar level, 
were averted by  rescue packages arranged with the Federal Reserve and 
the Bank of France. 
The second factor in the received account of the crisis is  the budget 
deficit, which, although not large by modern standards and on a full em- 
ployment basis may have been a surplus, was perceived by contemporaries 
who believed in fiscal orthodoxy as inconsistent  with adherence to the 
gold standard. According to Sayers, the budget deficit (and the May com- 
mittee report in July 1931, which forecast that it would rise) was the key 
factor driving the attack on sterling. The budget deficit also may explain 
the unwillingness to raise the discount rate because it would increase debt 
service. It is true that raising unemployment  by  raising unemployment 
benefits was interrelated with the deficit. But we need to know why the na- 
tional government formed in August 193  1, which did not include the La- 
bour Party, would have been hamstrung in the attempt to balance the bud- 
get because of the issue of rising unemployment. 
These points suggest that  in addition  to qualitative evidence for the 
main assumption of the paper, we need to see evidence that a simpler ex- 
planation for the crisis, based on the fundamentals of the balance of pay- 
ments and the government’s fiscal stance, with the timing of the attack 
related to the European banking crisis, does not explain the events of 
September 193  1. 
One point in the authors’ favor, however, is that there exists no convinc- 
ing explanation for the failure of the Bank of England to raise Bank rate 
in the following two months before abandoning gold, after doing so in 
July 1931. That the Bank was seriously committed to staying on gold is 
evident from the efforts made to obtain credits from the United States and 
France. Possibly the Bank did not raise Bank rate so as to put pressure 
on the government to balance the budget as Cairncross and Eichengreen 
suggest, or to frighten holders of sterling as Sayers posits, but the answer 
to the question, unless the authors are correct, seems still to be a mystery. 
On the other hand, why  is  it that the Bank of England, once it was 
released from convertibility constraints, did not immediately relax mone- 
tary policy in order to combat unemployment? Instead, it waited several 
months. 46  Barry Eichengreen and Olivier Jeanne 
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